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This paper is addressed to two questions: (1) Does the existing 
state of knov1ledge within the body of social science research provide an 
adequate information base for making decisions about public policies 
that affect technological change, and (2) What additional research 
might prove especially fruitful in its contribution to understanding the 
relationships between policy and innovation? In discussing these issues, 
every attempt will be made to push the existing state of knowledge as 
far as possible with respect to policy implications. Some of the proposi� 
tions put forth are reasonably well established theoretically or empriCally, 
but others should be accorded the status of unproved but plausible 
inferences. 
T]le underlying disciplinary perspective of this survey is 
distinctly that of; econon1ics. The objective is to identify (1) micro­
economic optimality conditions with ·respect to the rate and pattern of 
innovative activity and (2) institutions that would either cause the 
economic system t.o operate in a way that satisfied the optimality 
conditions or that, at least, unambiguously improved upon the current 
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performance. The second objective requires that the costs of managing 
an institutional arrangement be incorporated into the analysis. Conse­
quently, the literature on nonmarket decisions within organizations and 
on the behavior of institution-managing bureaucracies, notably government 
agencies, is also relevant, 
The ideas presented in this paper are distilled from the papers 
written for the Caltech R & D project on specific aspects of the relation 
between innovation and public policy. This paper is the summary of 
that project. The more detailed papers should be consulted for references 
to the relevant literature and for complete defenses of the propositions 
or of the conclusion that, on some issues, the literature leads only to a',i 
conundrum. 
THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS 
Try as we may, there is really no sensible way to begin a dis -
cussion of the notion of ''optimal technical progress11 without reference 
to some fairly abstract concepts in econo1nic theory. The reasons are, 
that, first, technical knowledge is an economic good -- it has value and 
is not infinitely available at zero cost -- and, second, the· m'arket for it 
is the embodiment of virtually e_very source of "market failure" that 
economists have ever investigated. The principle organizing concept 
behind most of the suCceeding discussion is the principle lesson to be 
drawn from what is probably the most arcane topic in economics, general 
equilibrium theory, which can be expressed very crudely as follows: 
Proposition 0: If perfectly competitive markets exist for 
all economic goods (including all futures and contingency 
markets), then the allocation of resources among produc� 
tive activities will be optimal in the sense that any change 
in that allocation must make someone worse off; further� 
more, any allocation of society's resources that is optimal 
in the same sense can be reached through a complete, 
cqmpetitive market system from some given initial distri­
bution of r�sources among consumers. 
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The difficulty with Proposition 0 is that, for numerous reasons, 
its presumptions are not desciptions of any real economic system. Not 
all markets exist, and not all that do exist are perfect. Furthermore, 
markets systems are costly to maintain in that resources are required 
to accommodate market transactions. Nevertheless, public economic 
policy can be viewed in the context of the proposition as seeking to 
create insitutions that perform the functions of a market in situations 
where markets are UO\Vorkable or more costly than substitutes, Furtherw 
more, since market failure can have many causes, the best choice of 
an institution to substitute for a market in any given case is likely to 
depend upon the nature of the market failure. 
The preceeding conceptual base underlies most of the work done 
by economists in building a theory of the innovative process. A divergence 
from optimality in technical progress is viewed as emanating from a 
failure of the market for ideas, The sources of failure that have been 
identified are: .(1) inappropriability
_
: the inability of the innovator to 
capture the full economic gains made posSible by his innovation; (2) 
uncertainty:- the economic uses of the technical ideas that will emanate 
from R & D activities are not known fully in advance, so that the search 
for innovations is a gamble; (3) indivisibilities: the minimum efficient 
scale of R & D operations can be sufficiently large that the market for a 
particular class of ideas can not be perfect; and (4) indirect failures: 
if a good must be produced and distributed outside of a perfect market 
environment, the institutions created to bring this about ma):' lead to 
inefficiencies in the advancement of �nowledge with respect to production 
and distribution of the good. Each of these notions will be exani.ined 
separately. 
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Before proceeding with an examination of these issues, a few 
general remarks and definitions are in order. 
The conventional wisdom among public policy-makers and as 
expressed in much of the literature concerning technological innovation 
is that, somehow, there is not Henough" research and development, and 
that government can and should attack this problem through various 
policies that increase financial incentives for R & D and innovative 
behavior generally. The single most important conclusion of this paper, 
and of the Caltech R & D project generally, is that the existing literature 
does not establish either that too little innovative activity takes place, 
or that government can be particularly effective in devising cost-effective 
strategies to promote more R & D, or even which of the four sources 
of market failure listed above .is the most important and, therefore, 
should receive the most attention from policy makers. Furthermore, 
existing policies do, on balance, promote R & D relative to other 
investments, at least in industries not subject lo public utility regulation, 
so that even if the case is made that a private market economy generates 
too little R & D, it is by no means established that this is not offset by 
existing policy interventions. · Much more solid theoretical and empirical 
research must be undertaken before any of these iss•1es can be resolved 
sufficiently to warrant strong conclusions about the general s�ance of 
policy towards innovative activity. 
The following discussiori adopts two semantic conventions. 
First, the major ideas.that have been distilled from the literature are 
stated as propositiuns. These are not necessarily restatements of 
theorems from the theoretical literature, although in a few cases they 
are. Some are empritical findings, and some are plausible but unproven 
inferences. 
conclusion, 
Thus, a proposition is a summary statement of a research 
and can have a status anywhere from a reasonable hypothesis 
or conjecture to a natural law. 
Second, an attempt has been made to be meticulous in differentiating 
between absolute and relativ:e firm size. Adjectives such "large" and 
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11small" refer to absolute size, while "monopolistic11 and ucompetitive11 
reier to firms that do or do not possess market power. In an oligopoly, 
the firtns with the most market power. are "dominant" or "leading," while 
the others are "domi.nated.11 The two concepts of firm size -- absolute 
vs. relative -- play quite different roles in the literature, although 
authors do not always state clearly which concept they are discussing'. 
Ap propriability 
The appropriability problem arises from the presumption that 
to some extent the discoverer of new information can not prevent others 
from taking advantage of it without paying the discoverer the full value 
of the information. Since innovators do not capture all the benefits of 
their discoveries, it follows that: 
Proposition Al: Because of the absence of full appropri­
ability, too few resources will be allocated to developing 
new knowledge. 
This proposition has been subject to challenge in two ways. 
First, son1e doubt the validity of its premise: that technical knowledge 
is, to an important extent, inappropriable. While unanimity can not be 
reached on the· issue, consensus can probably be reached on two points: 
Proposition AZ: The extent of appropriability differs from 
industry to �ndustry, and is likely to be greater for monop­
olies {no competitors will exploit the monopolist1s ideas). 
Proposition A3: Presuming that a continuum of R & D 
activities from basic research through developmental 
research through final product innovation makes sense, 
the more basic the idea the less appropriable it is likely 
to be. 
One prediction arising from AZ and A3 is that the greater the 
market power of the firm, the more likely .it is to be innovative since it 
caa appropriate more of the results of i.ts R &. D. E::mpirical tests of 
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this prediction are inconclusive, in part because of the failure to date 
of researches to develop a satisfactory measure of market power. 
The second line of attack on Al is based on its implicit premise 
that innovation is economically motivated. The argument against profit 
motives is most convincingly made with respect to basic scientific 
research. Most basic research takes place in nonprofit institutions 
and its results are made freely available. This does not establish 
that the amOunt and type of innovative activity taking place is insensitive 
to financial incentives; instead, it merely suggests that even if financial 
incentives are lacking, some advancements in knowledge will still take 
place. Thus, 
Proposition A4: While the rate and pattern of technical 
change is sufficiently sensitive to financial incentives that 
the workings of the market for ideas are a legitimate 
policy concern, nevertheless some important advances in 
knowledge are not in response to incentives and would occur 
even if there were total failure in the market for knowledge. 
In principle, at leas_t, A4 weakens A I. The absence of 
commercial R & D activities in an economic arena in v;hich nonprofit 
institutions are active may be due to inapprl'.'priability, but it may also 
be because the nonprofit institutions are so active that the· ra'.te of return 
to further R & D in that arena is., even with full appropriability, 
uneconomically low. Although empirical studies show that the average 
return to investm"!nt in R & D exceeds the average return to other 
investments, the evidence is not conclusive that these differences persist 
at the margin (i.e., that they apply to the last dollar invested in each 
category) or that the differences are greater than is appropriate for the 
differences i'n the riskiness of R & D and other investments. 
Several institutions are used to increase the app:ropriability 
of technical knowledge, notably the patent system, copyright laws, and 
protections of trade secrets. These syst_ems, being voluntary {a firm 
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need not take advantage of them to protect its rights to knowledge), must, 
since they are used, increase the appropriability of innovations; however, 
' 
they can not eliminate the appropriability problem: 
Proposition AS: The system protecting rights to knowledge, 
because it is costly to operate, still results in too little 
R & D since innovators must expect one cost of an innova­
tion to be the deployment of the rights system to protect 
their discoveries. 
At the same time, the existence of a system granting rights to 
knowledge generates an incentive to discover ways to accomplish the 
same end :'ls another innovation, but in a manner that does not infringe· 
upon the rights of others: 
Proposition A6: The system for securing rights to know­
ledge generates socially unproductive R & D organized 
solely to invent around the discoveries of others. 
That 11inventing around11 should take place is difficult to explain within 
the conve.ntional economics paradigm. Both an original innovator and 
a copier should have an incentive to make a licensing arrangement 
instead of having the copier pursue secondary research activities. The 
copier expects to spend son1e given amount on R & D in order to copy 
successfully without infringing on the innovators rights; once he 
succeeds, the innovator receives no financial return from the sales 
of the copier. Thus, any licensing fee between zero and the R & D 
costs of the copier ought to benefit both sides. 
Finally, the importance of the appropriability of innovation in 
leading to resource misallocations depends upon the elasticity of supply 
of innovative ideas. In the extreme, for research activities that are 
hig�ly labor-intensive and in which there is essentially no possibility of 
improving the productivity of cre<itive talent by giving talented :researchers 
more resources -- an example might be Abstract areas of mathematics, 
theoretical physics or even economic theory -- an increase in the appro­
priability of research results will, if all of the people with talent for that 
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activity are already engaged in it, lead only to increases in the income 
of the research personnel, with no increase in innovative output. More 
generally: 
Proposition A?: The more inelastic the supply of innovative 
ideas at and above the current equilibrium; the less 
significant th� divergence from optimality in innovative 
activity due to inappropriability of ideas. 
An institutional arrangement that ini::reases appropriability of 
resources can, in principle at least, actually worsen allocative efficiency, 
in part because of the effects of A5, A6 and A? and in part because 
appropriability is a euphemism for monopoly: 
Proposition AS: A fully appropriable innovation will be 
used less extensively than is economically optimal. 
Only a: perfectly discriminating monopolist can extract rnonopoly rents . 
without destroying allocative efficiency. Otherwise, a monopolized 
economic good -- whether an idea or a more ni.undane product -- has too 
high a price. Since the social costs of allowing one more producer to 
have access to a fully-developed cost-saving idea are zero, any positive 
licensing fee for employing it excludes, in principle at least, some users 
who would find the idea economically valuable, but less valuable than the 
license fee. 
Summarizing AS through AS, it is not necessarily true that 
increasing the appropriability of innovations improves the rate of tech­
nical progress or increases the efficiency with which creative resources 
are deployed: 
Proposition A9: Increasing the appropriability of innovations 
will reduce the rate of technical progress if the supply of 
innov,ative ideas is sufficiently inelastic that the new know-
ledge forthcoming because of greater appropriability does not 
offset the effect of greater appropriability on (a) incentives 
for 11inventing around, 11 (b) the costs of maintaining property 
rights to knowledge, and (c) monopolistic inefficiencies in 
exploitation and diffusion of new ideas. 
P�oposition AIO: Increasing the·appropriability of innovations 
can reduce the efficiency of the allocation of creative talent 
among alternative R & D activities if either of the following 
effects occur: (a) the increase in appropriability is greatest 
for innovative activities for which appropriability is already 
relatively high, or (b) for types of innovations for which 
appropriability is increased the most, the change in appro­
priability causes more resources to be committed to 
"inventing around!! and maintaining the syste1n of rights to 
knowledge than are added to R & D activities associated with 
· the same types of innovations. 
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The principle lesson to be learned from the preceeding discus­
sion is that the problem of creating an efficient market for ideas is 
exceedingly contplex. The degree of appropriability that should be 
accorded to innovative activity of any particular type should depend 
upon the original appropriability of innovations generally and the �ype 
in question in particular, the extent to which exogenous developments 
can be expected, the supply elasticity of �nnovation, and the costs of 
greater app.ropriability in terms of maintaining rights and monopolizing 
ideas. It is likely that, in the real world, conditions will differ 
enough from industry to industry and along the continuum fro1n basic 
to applied research that no single system of establishing rights to know­
ledge and markets for them will produce satisfacotry results in terms 
of its effect on the rate and pattern of innovation. 
Uncertainty 
The effect of uncertainty on innovative activity arises because 
of the absence of adequate insurance againsi: the failure of an R & D 
project. There are basically two reasons why a contingencies· market 
IO 
may not develop for an activity subject to uncertainty. First, if the 
person buying insurance can control the likelihood that the event being 
insured against will transpire, the existence of insurance can create 
incentives to devote less than full effort to avoiding the contingency. 
Thus, if a firm could buy full R & D insurance -- that is, the insurance 
company would repay the firm the cost of the R & D program if the 
program did not produce a commercially viable output -- it would have 
less of an incentive to make its R & D project succeed. Second, the 
potential innovator is likely to have a different estimate of the likely 
success of a project than an insuror, Assuming that information and 
expertise add to one1s ability to predict the potential of an R & D 
activity, the innovator is likely to perceive less uncertainty about the 
project than those from whom he might buy insurance; therefore the 
expected riskiness of insuring the project -- hence the insurance 
premium -- will be higher to the insuror than if he had more complete 
knowledge. As a result: 
Proposition Ul: Inadequately developed contingency markets­
for innovative activities cause innovators who are more risk-
averse.than average to engage in less innovative activity than 
is optimal. 
Proposition U2: Inadequately developed contingency markets 
for innovative activity cause ·innovators with atypically great 
risk-taking propensities to over-invest in their own ideas 
(risk-taking ir,�,ovators would do better by investing in the 
best ideas of risk-averse innovators than in the least pro­
ductive investments based upon their own ideas). 
The principal nonmarket substitution for contingency insurance 
is the 11self-irisurance" associated with investing in a diversified prot­
folio of projects. The rationale behind self-insurance, or portfolio 
theory, is, in its simplest case, that a series of very small bets is 
less risky than one large bet -- i.e. it is less risky to flip a coin for a 
dollar twice than to flip once for two dollars. 
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Self-insurance can take place only in organizations that are 
large enough to carry on a large number of diverse research projects.· 
AssllDJ-ing that R & D projects must b
.
e operated above some minimum 
rate per time period in order tO conclude soon enough to be worth 
pursuing, then: 
Proposition U3: Abstracting from any effect that firm size 
may have on the effectiveness of a iirm1s organizational 
structure, its risk-taking propensities, or the extent of 
competition, large firms with diverse R & D programs 
will undertake more projects subject to risk and uncertainty 
than will small firms, and a given industry will be more 
innovative with a smaller number of large firms than with 
. a larger number of small firms. 
Uncertainty, per se, does not lead .to the conclusion that if markets 
are monopolized, firms are more innovative, as does the inappropri­
ability argument; however if one dimension of uncertainty is the extent 
to which rights to the new idea can be enforced, then a monopolistic 
firm in a market with blockaded entry -- for example, a regulated public 
utility -- will perceive less uncertainty in a given R & D project than 
will a competit�ve firm. Aside fro:n:i this effect, the uncertainty of 
R & D projects leads to an argument for iarge firms, but not for 
uncompetitiVe ones. 
In fact, one procompetitive argument is based on the presence 
of uncertainty. If competitors are engaging in R & D, a firm is 
subject to the risk that competitors will discover a process that will 
significantly reduce the profitability of the firm. If the expected return 
from R & D: projects to the firm is zero -- that is, it anticipates equal 
future profits whether it invests in R & D or not -- then under certain 
plausible conditions failing to. engag� in R & D can be subject to more 
uncertainty than undertaking R & D projects: 
Proposition U4: Engaging in R & D activitieS at the norm 
of a competitive industry when R & D has zero expected 
return is less risky than engaging in no R & D as long as 
innovations are not fully inappropriable and most firms 
engage in more or less the normal amount of R & D for 
firms in the industry. 
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The point is simply that the uncertainty that projects v.ill succeed must 
be weighed against uncertainties concerning the future market position 
of a firm with respect to its competitors. Thus, expectations about 
the behavior of other firms, which in turn are .probably based upon the 
historical pattern of innovation in the industry, can be a crucial factor 
in determining each firm's decisions about future R & D and innovation. 
In a monopoly in which entry is effectively blockaded, the 
firm1s expectation about competition is that other firms are not a 
Potential threat, Hence: 
Proposition US: For innovations of predetermined appro­
priability (i.e. assuming market power does not contribute 
to appropriability) and a given degree of uncertainty with 
respect to technical and marketing success, a monopolist 
is less likely to pursue and adopt them than a competitor, 
The reasoning behind the pro:Position is that, holding everything else 
constant, the absence of a competitive innovative threat reduces the 
uncertainty associated with doing nothing. 
Finally, uncertainty in the outcome of R & D activities has an 
important implication with respeCt to selecting the best R & D strategy. 
In an uncertain environment, R & D programs are more likely to be 
profitable if their organization and operations are characterized by 
flexibility, mixed strategies, and 'sequential decision-making, all of 
which are designed to use the added information that is acquired as 
R & D progre,sses. As more information is collected, the better able 
are decision-makers to estimate the likely success of alternative actions, 
and hence an R & D program is more likely to succeed if more options 
remain open as R & D proceeds. Hence: 
Proposition U6: Assuming firm size does not affect 
decision-making procedures in a counter-acting fashion, 
l:!rge firms are more likely to be able to pursue suitable 
R & D strategies than small firms since the more. diversified 
the research program of a firm, the more numerous are the 
other activities that might be profitably redirected on the 
basis of information acquired during an R & D project. 
13 
The defense of this proposition depends on the same kind of arguments 
with respect to the absence of adequate contingency markets that are the 
underpinning of the self-insurance notion expressed in U3. 
The upshot of the investigations into the effects of uncertainty is 
somewhat more conclusive than that of the appropriability discussion, 
although not without ils own dilemmas. Uncertainty is more likely to 
be dealt with optir>.1.ally if firrns are large enough so that their R & D 
programs are large compared to particular R & D projects, thereby 
allowing greater self-insurance and opportunity for responding to new 
information. At the same time, the threat of competitive innovation is 
an important factor in determining the willingness of the firm to accept 
R & D uncertainty.: hence the effects of the minim.urn size requirements 
in U3 and U6 can be offset if they require that firms be so large that 
markets are not competitive. 
Indivisibilities 
The indivisibilities argument is an assertion about the empirical 
realities of the production of new ideas. It holds: 
Proposition II: In some significant number of cases, 
R & D activities exhibit sufficiently large scale economies 
that only large organizations can s upport efficient R & D 
operations, 
These indivisibilities involve a number of effects other than the self­
insurance and flexibility arguments made with respect to uncertainty. 
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For example, some advantage is said to be gained from having a group 
of scientific researchers in the same organization so that they can 
benefit from mutual interaction. Or, in the case of highly complex 
products, such as airplanes, developmental costs may be large 
compared to the total demand fa:- the product. 
At the same time, plausible explanantions have been offered for 
precisely the opposite phenomenon: that R &. D has diseconomies of scale. 
Proposition 12: The larger the organization, the greater 
the cost of maintaining adequate information flows and 
control of subordinate behavior, with the effect being 
larger the less amenable is the activity of the organiza­
tion to routinization and rule-rnaking. 
Since in the presence of uncertainty activities must be flexible and 
decisions must be based upon a continuing stream of new information, 
R & D (especially basic research) activities would seem particularly 
unsuited to large organizations. Furthermore, the less well-defined the 
problem facing researchers, the greater the difficulty of carrying out 
the activity in large organiza'.tions. Thus: 
Proposition 13: Smaller organizations are more likely to 
be an important source of advances in ffiore basic reseaTCh 
and of more revolutionary innovations, ·while large firms 
are more likely to be an important source of innovations at 
the more developmental end of the R & D continuum and of 
more increme ntal kinds of technical advances. 
Empirical investigations r,irovide some support for I3: firms of average 
and slightly above average size seem to do a disproportionately large 
share of innqvating in many industries; rarely is the largest firm in a n  
industry the source of major technical progress; and very small firms, 
often from outside the industry, frequently account for major research 
breakthroughs, although on average small firms commit proportionately 
fewer' resources to R & D than do other firms. 
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These observations weaken the case for large firms made in 
the prt:1ceeding section on uncertainty-. Propositions U3 and U6, in 
particular, depend upon assertions about the unimportance of IZ and 13. 
Secondary Effects of Government Interventions 
A relatively small part of government intervention into private 
markets is motivated by the desire to improve innovative performance. 
Yet all interventions alter the incentives faced by firms, and hence the 
rate and pattern of innovations they produce, Unfortunately, the study 
of this process is one of the most neglected areas of social science 
research. Nearly all of the systemmatic theoretical and empirical 
work is on one of three topics: the incidence of taxes, the behavior 
of the firm that is subjected to rate-of-return regulation, and the 
consequences of antitrust policies. Very little work has been undertaken 
on other aspects of regulation, such as standard-setting and licensing, 
or on governn1ental production and procurement. 
Antitrust Policies. Commentary on the effects of antitrust 
activities on innovation follows essentially the lines discussed in the 
preceeding section with respect to the relationship between the size and 
market power of 
_
the firm and the propensity to innovate. If large firms 
that possess substantial market power are more innova.tive because they 
enjoy greater appropriability, more opportunity to capture scale economies, 
and a larger pool for self-insuring risk and uncertainty, than active anti­
trust activity, however beneficial in terms of static efficiency, reduces 
the rate of technical progress. But if technical competition, internal 
flexibility and a diversity of attacks on technical problems .are more 
important factors in determining technical progress, then both static 
and dynamic efficiency are served by vigorc;>us anti.trust policy. 
One other aspect of antitrust activity is its effect on an e.spe­
. cially well-managed firm. A talented managerial group may adopt 
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policies that make its firm dominant in an industry by virture of the 
superiority of the price/quality combination of its product, Once such 
a firm increases its market share to the point where antitrust action 
becomes a possibility, management will lose the incentive to make 
further improvements in the firm1s market position. If the market 
dominance of the firm is due to especially creative R & D activities, 
the result is reduced technical progress by the leading firm: 
Proposition Sl: Antitrust activities reduce the incentive 
of firms with strong market positions to generate more 
rapid technical progress than is normal for firms in the 
industry. 
Even dorninated firms can find that the ceiling on firm size 
reduces R & D incentives: 
Proposition SZ: The ceiling on firm dominance limits 
the maximum potential profitability of revolutionary 
technical advances for all firms; and 
Proposition S3: Limitations on the dominance of firms 
reduce technical competition, so that for dominated 
firms the potential profitability of engaging in no innovative 
activities is increased. 
At the same time, antitrust policies can have positive effects 
on the incentive to innovate. AS a dominant firm approaches maximum 
allowable size, the potential profitability of employing creative resources 
converges to the t:xpected loss in profits that would come about if the 
resources moved to another firm and made that firm a more effective 
competitor. The incentive faced by dominated firms is greater, since 
the potentia� profitability of the resource would include gains captured 
from all other firms in the industry. Furthermore, the reduced expected 
rate of progress of the leading firm in some ways increases the potential 
profitability of R & D in other firms by reducing the chance that the 
R & D programs of the latter will produce less successful innovations 
than the program of the for:mer. Hence: 
Proposition S4: Antitrust policies increase the incentive 
of dominated firms relative to dominant firms to engage 
in innovative activity, and can increase the absolute 
incentive of the former if reduced technical threats from 
the latter are sufficiently valuable to offset the effects 
described in S2 and S3. 
17 
The pl·eceeding discussion abstracts from the reasons for the 
dominance of the leading firm except insofar as it might arise from 
more rapid technical progress. Do1ninance can arise for reasons having 
nothing to do with technical performance, .such as monopolization of an 
input market or purely pecuniary scale economies (such as advertising 
barriers to competition), The profitability of R & D for dominated 
firms in these kinds of markets is reduced to the extent that technical 
virtuosity is limited in its impact due to other advantages of the dominant 
firm. To the extent that antitrust policy limits or even eliminates 
these other advantages, the potential profitability of R & D to all firms, 
including the leading one, can be increased. 
The most important point to remember in attempting to assess 
the i1npact of antitrust policies on innovative behavior is that the effects 
upon the leading firni. do not necessarily imply anything conclusive about 
the effects upon other firms or innovative individuals, Even if antitrust 
policy reduces th"e incentive for dominant firms to innovate, as long as other 
firms believe that technical competition will still be pervasive antitrust 
policy can increase their incentive to innovate. And, from the 
point of view of innovative m::i.nagers with less risk-aversion than 
typifies the industry, procompetitive policy actions will serve primarily 
to induce them to n1ove fro1n dominant to dominated firms, particularly 
if R &: D is not subject to scale economies and if the dominance of 
leading firms arises for other than technological reasons. 
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�· While few investigations have been undertaken of the 
effect of taxation on R & D, the literature on tax incidence deals with the 
problem of risky investments in sufficient detail that some of the effects 
on R & D can be inferred as special cases. The most obvious aspect of 
taxation is that it reduces the profitability and the risk of any form of 
investment, including investment in R & D. Even a 11neutral" tax --
i.e. one that leaves unchanged the ranking of investments according to 
expected rate of return -- can affect the selection among investment 
alternatives by causing a reduction in the differences among them in 
riskiness. Consequently: 
Proposition SS: An increase in taxation will make all invest­
ments less attractive, but it will improve the relative attrac­
tiveness of n1ore risky investments. 
Whether an increase in taxes leads to more or less R & D depends 
upon: (1) whether R & D is more or less risky than other types of 
investment and (2) whether the effect of the tax increase in narrowing 
risk differentials among investment"alternatives offsets the effec.t of 
generally reduced after-tax profitability for all investments. A tax 
increase can increase R & D if R & D is, in general, both more profit-
able and more risky than other forms of investment and if the ta,'{ increase 
reduces the relative riskiness of R & D mor'e than enough to 'offset the 
reduction in its absolute expected profitability. 
The relevant issue for tax policy is more complicated than the 
general principle enunciated in SS, since it involves the selection from 
among numerous taxes the combination that will generate some target 
amount of revenue with the minimum. attendant socially undesirable 
effects on economic incentives and income distribution. What policy 
makers need, in this context is a set of comparative statements about the 
impacts of various types of taxes on investment behavior, R &: D and 
productivity advance. Unfortunately, the literature provides few insights 
into this issue. 
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Under current practice, R & D expenditures are, for tax purposes, 
normally treated as current expenses, as are training expenses (which 
' 
conceptually are investments in human capital), whereas fixed capital 
investments are amortized over the useful life of the asset. Further-
more, the depreciation allowances for capital investments are, to some 
extent, earmarked for future replacement of the capital good, whereas 
new knowledge does not 11wear out" in the sense that machinery does, 
Proposition S6: If the tax treatment of R & D and investment 
were perfectly symmetrical in terms of their effects on 
incentives, R & D '\Vould be classified a.s a capital investment, 
and amortized as an intangible asset with a useful life that 
ends when an invention becomes obsolete. 
To treat R & D expenses as current expenditures, not as investments, 
is to subsidize them relative to investments in fixed capital. Thus, 
an argument that, because of the theoretical problems mentioned above, 
economic efficiency requires a tax subsidy of R & D does not neces­
sarily imply that subsidization should be increased, since the tax 
system already makes an investment in R & D of given gross profita­
bility worth more in terms of net, after tax profits than a comparably 
profitable investment in fixed capital. 
An increase in capital gains taxation serves to reduce the 
attractiveness of R & D relative to fixed capital investments. Since 
R &_ D expenditures are regarded as current expenses, any increase 
in the value of a firm that they cause is, if the knowledge or the firm 
is sold, taxed entirely as a capital gain. An investment in fixed capital 
that is depreciated more rapidly than the actual decline in its economic 
value will, if sold, be subject to income tax recapture of excess 
depr�ciation. Hence: 
Proposition S7: The higher the capital gains tax rate, the 
less the value of the preferential treatmen� of R & D for 
tax purposes. 
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Finally, a few things can be said about specific tax rules that 
might be imposed to induce more R &: D. Some advocates of tax sub­
sidies for R & D have proposed a counterpart to the investment tax 
credit for expenditures on R & D, Some fixed percentage of R & D 
expenditures could then be deducted from tax liabilities, rather than 
from gross income before taxes, in calculating the total tax bill. These 
kinds of proposals have the benefit of being automatic, thereby avoiding 
bureaucratic decision-making processes except insofar as tax returns 
are audited; however they also have one large disadvantage: 
Proposition SS: Automatic, universal tax subsidies are 
inefficient in that some of the tax subsidy inevitably 
goes for investments in R & D that would have taken 
place anyway without a subsidy. 
One mechanism for avoiding this inefficiency is to apply the tax subsidy 
only to net increments in R & D spending. For example, the historical 
average annual rate of growth of R & D spending in real terms would be 
calculated, and a tax credit given to firms equal to some proportion of 
R & D expenditures represe�ting an increase over that historical average 
growth rate. This 'vould provide an especially strong incentive for R & D 
on the part of a firm that historically had done very little innovating, 
since nearly all of any substantial R &_ D program would, .\vh'en initiated, 
receive the favorable tax treatment. But even this proposal does not 
escape a second fundamental problem of tax subsidy proposals: 
Proposition �12.; A firm must have sufficient after tax 
profits to utilize the tax subsidy system in order for 
such a program to·affect its R & D decisions. 
Any subsidization system based upon reducing income taxation is biased 
against smail, new firms. In light of Proposition 13 (major innovations 
tend to come from small firms), this is an important shortcoming of tax 
subsidy proposals, It
_
can only b e  overcome by imposing a "negative 
income tax11 for corporations -- i.e., instituting a procedure whereby 
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firms without sufficient profits to take full advantage of R & D tax 
subsidies would receive payments from the Treasury to make up for 
this s�ortcoming. Unfortunately, such a system would have some 
tendency to reward the inefficient as well as making life easier for the 
struggling nev: innovative fir1n. 
Regulation. As used herein, regulation refers to two types of 
governmental control over business: the setting of prices or profit 
rates {public utility regulation) or the establishment of minimum per­
formance criteria (standards regulation). Always the former and often 
the latter involve entry controls as well. -To illustrate, the Federal 
Communications Commission has mainly public utility responsibilities 
with. respect to telecommunications and mainly standards responsibilities 
with respect to broadcasting. It controls entry in both cases. These 
examples also illustrate the theoretical, rather than strictly realistic, 
dichotomy of regulatory responsibilities, since performance objectives 
are at least implicit in telecommunications decisions, and entry control 
in broadcasting is based in part on conSiderations of economic viability. 
Nevertheless, a useful conceptual distinction can be made between 
policies intended to compensate for .external effects and information 
problems that cause failure of competitive markets (interference among 
broadcaste�s, social consequences of program content) and policies 
designed to limit the exercise of 11na.tura1'1 monopoly power. 
With respect to public utility regulation, the principal proposi­
tion offered in the literature is the familiar Averch-Johnson hypothesis 
that monopolistic firms whose profits are limited to a fixed proportion 
of capital investment will use excessive capital in producing their outputs. 
Applied to technical change, this becomes: 
Proposition SlO: R ate-of-returi:;J. regulation causes firms to 
engage in excessively capital-using inn?vation. 
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A related proposition has to do with the optimal strategy of a 
regulated firm with respect to depreciation. Because profits are a 
proportion of capital investment, firms have an incentive to depreciate 
the capital stock more slowly than would otherwise be the case. As a 
result: 
Proposition S l l :  A regulated firn1 will replace old equipment 
more slowly than is optimal, leading to a suboptimally small 
embodiment of current knowledge in the existing capital stock. 
In a sense, these propositions predict that innovation among 
regulated firms will be both too fast and too slow. There \vill be too 
much exploration of new ways to substitute capital for labor, but once 
a useful innovation is identified, it will be diffused too slowly through 
the capital stock of the firm. These notions are not necessarily contra-
dictory: the first refers primarily to a bias in technical change, while 
the latter refers more to its rate -- and then with respect to the replace­
ment of existing capital with new equipment embodying current knowledge. 
A-J models are a particular example of cost-plus regulation. 
While telecommunications, power and airline firms tend to be subject 
to rate-of- return regulation, othe r major regulated industries -­
most notably surface transportation -- formally have profits limited 
to some p ercentage of revenues or costs. \!ihile this type of regulation 
avoids the capital-intensivity bias of rate-of-return regulation, it 
can create its own kind of inefficiencies. 
Proposition Sl�: If, using the most efficient methods, a 
monopolistic firm, facing cost-plus regulation and setting 
price equal to long-run average costs, finds that the equili­
brium price and output is on the inelastic portion of its 
demand c.urve, it has an incentive to use less efficient pro-
duction methods (e . g. to pad costs). 
When the conditions of SlZ hold, a firm can increase total 
revenues (and thereby total profits, which are a ' fixed proportion of 
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total revenues) by selling less output at a higher price and a higher cost 
per unit of output. Of course, such a firm •vould not be particularly 
thrillediby the prospect of a cost-reduc:ing innovation; however, it 
would be excessively motivated to adopt innovations that increase the 
quality of service, but at a greater cost. Conversely, if the demand 
curve is elastic at the most effici€.nt regulatory equilibrium, the firm• 
will have an extra iocentive to adopt cost-reducing (and service­
degrading) innovations. 
Models of regulated firms that postulate profit maximization 
subject to a cost-based constraint on profits are a simplified 
characterization of the -regulatory process, ·and probably should not be 
taken very seriously. They assume that a firm faces a profit constraint 
that is stable and known during its planning horizon, an assumption that 
is obviously unrealistic for four reasons. First, regulatory policies 
may change in unpredictable ways during the twenty to forty year 
planning horizon of the regulated utility because of unpredictable changes 
in the external environment (e.g. lhe energy crisis). Second, regulatory 
policies may be to some degree altered by strategic actions of the firm, 
in which case a decision by a firm must take account not just of its 
effect on profits ·given the regulatory .rules, but also on the rules 
themselves. Third, the monopoly position of the firm is presumed to 
be given and unaltE'.rable, whereas much of public utility regulation has 
to do with deciding upon the optimal extent of competition and the identity 
of the firms permitted into a market. Fourth, the model presumes that 
a regulatory authority can, in fact, measure costs and profits with 
reasonable ease and accuracy, removing from consideration what is 
probably the. single most time-consuming regulatory activity, the 
esti1nation of allowable costs and a 11fair11 rate of return. 
This is not to say that the inefficiencies predicted by A-J and 
cost-plus models can not or do not exist. It !s simply to say that 
investment decisions, whether in equipment or in knowledge, ar.e 
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likely to reflect a far more complicated set of strategic considerations 
than the ceteris paribus effect on allowed profits. 
Studies of the airline industry, in particular, are the most 
suggestive of the complexities of decisions by regulated firms. Air­
lines are to some extent competitive, and policy, cost and demand 
factors are changable over time. Research on the airline industry 
typically concludes that attempts to maintain prices above the competitive 
equilibrium result in the provision of excessive service, including too 
rapid adoption of new planes: 
Proposition 513: R egulated competition which maintains 
prices above competitive levels encourages excessively 
rapid innovation as firms substitute competition with 
respect to technical advanCe (among other things) for 
price co1npetition. 
In addition, the presence of some sort of cost-plus regulation can reduce 
the downside risk of failures, and the presence of competitive license 
awards can, when prices are too high, cause firms to be excessi"."ely 
innovative if to do so enhances their chances of being viewed favorably 
by regulators. With respect to airlines, all of these arguments have 
been used to support the contention that service innovations and advances 
in aircraft have come more rapidly than is e�onomically efficient. 
Organizational studies o� regulatory bureaucracies emphasize 
still another feature of regulation: the slowness \vith \vhich regulators 
make decisions. 11Regtilatory lag" is the term given to the observation 
that policy responses to changes in the regulatory environment are often 
significantly delayed. If an innovation can not be adopted without approval 
of regulators, regulatory.lag delays it, thereby reducing its expected 
profitability, and thereby reducing the incentive to be innovative. (Thia 
argument is used to explain the lethargy of railroads with respect 
to innovation. ) Innovations that can be adopted without regulatory 
approval can give the firm the opportunity to earn profits in excess of 
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those allowed by regulators until the latter have responded to the cost 
and demand structure created by the innovation. (This argument has 
been advanced to explain the value of .Bell Labs to AT & T.) If the 
duration of the regulatory lag is roughly commensurate with the rate of 
diffusion of innovation in a competitive industry, it could cause regulated 
firms to face the same incentives for innovation_ as do perfectly comr)eti� 
tive firms. 
These and other ideas about the efficiency of technical progress 
among regulated firms seem n1ore fragmentary, contradictory and 
unrealistic than is typical of even the generally unsatisfying literature 
on unregulated firms. Virtually no theoretical work has been done on 
the extent to which the conclusions of the A-J type models depend upon 
their exclusion of the numerous other strategic and informational issues 
attendant to the regulatory process. Certainly such theoretical work 
should have a high pri·ority. In addition, little attempt has been made 
to connect regulation to other policies to which regulated firms are 
subject, most notably taxation. For example, if the use of capital is 
taxed more heavily than the use of other productive resources, A-J 
effects might be offset within the context of the model. 
With respect to standard setting regulation, the Averch­
Johnson conception of regulators imposing constraints on firms has a 
clear counterpar� in the literature about standards. Here regulators 
are asswned to impose a performance standard on the firm, which 
reacts accordingly to maximize profits. 
One issue discussed in the literature, particularly with respect 
to environmental policy, deals with the problems of imposing new 
standards qn the production of established goods, In comparison with 
taxation, standards are criticized because they provide no i�centive to 
seek innovations that more than just.satisfy the standard, whereas 
emissions taxes give firms a possibility of, reducing tax costs by 
further innovation beyond the policy target impliCit in the standards. 
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The other major issue with respect to standard setting pertains 
to the requirement that ne\V products or facilities be given a seal of 
approval, as is the case with drug licensing and nuclear safety regula­
tion. In these cases standards increase the cost of innovation. Their 
effect on the amount of innovation is not clear on a purely theoretical 
basis, since the higher costs tend to retard innovations but the standard 
setting process increases their appropriability by making competitive 
innovations and copying more expensive. Efficacy standards for new 
drugs have, in particular, been singled out as having a detrimental effect 
on consumers. They are said to constrain the introduction of much 
cheaper but slightly less efficacious drugs. In addition, because patents 
are said to take care of appropriability, they are alleged to reduce the 
profitability of even those neV>'. drugs that successfully treat a previously 
untreatable condition. 
In some cases standards regulation prescribes which inputs 
and processes are to be used, as opposed to rules that establish minimum 
output standards. Such rules are quite common in the medical care 
sector, where certain services must be performed by specified occupa­
tional groups and where medical malpractice liability is often determined 
on the b<>.sis of the extent to which traditional and generally accepted 
practices were followed in treating a patient. This type of s�andard 
setting is, of course, anathema to innovation. For a new process to 
become legal in such a circumshance, the standards must be changed, 
and to change them not only involves waiting out the regulatory decisiOn 
processes but als winning an adversary contest against those with a 
substantial personal stake in maintaining the primacy of the established 
method. 
When the motivation for setting standards is an informational 
imperfection' in the market , the alternatives to standards based On process, 
comparative safety and efficacy are twofold: (I} the requirement; •.vith 
threat of serious penalty, to supply truthful and complete information 
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about a product, coupled with free entry, and (2) comprehensive producer 
liability and antifraud policies. Examples of the former are the 1 1truth 
in lendin_g-1 1  law, statements about the n17tritional content of breakfast 
cereals and warnings on cigarettes, while the medical malpractice suit is  
an example of the latter. U the person making the decision to use a 
potentially hazardous or ineffective product is assumed to be capable df 
responding rationally to complete information, the former strategy can 
be both inexpensive and successful. For example, the textile labeling 
requirements of the Federal Trade Corn.mission are apparently suc<:essful 
in providing adequate warning at minin�al cost to people with severe 
allergies. Resort to liability and damage lawsuits seems less promising, 
in part because it is  an extremely expensive process and in part' because 
of the uncertainty introduced by the tenuous connection between damage 
awards by juries and the actual damages suffered. 
The preceeding discussion leads to the following conclusions 
about standitrd-setting regulation: 
Proposition Sl4:  Economic incentives and, when externalities 
are not involved, information requirements are likely to 
generate more innovative behavior bi regulated firms than 
are performance standards, and performance stanrlards are 
likely to rank ahead of input or process· standards. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The preceeding discussion obviously produces little in the way 
of direct implications with respect to the government actions that might 
improve the innovative performance of the American economy. On the · 
other hanp, it suggests numerous opportunities for further research 
into the innovative process and the consequences of existing government . 
policies with respect to technological change. 
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Government Policy Towards R & D 
The main· lesson to be learned from the existing literat.ure is 
that numerous factors are likely to affect the innovative behavior of 
firms and the extent to which innovative performance, when guided . only 
by private market decisions, is likely to diverge from economic optimality. 
Since the conditions in which firms operate vary with respect to these 
fc..ctors, the only firm conclusion about generalized, economy-wide 
policy is a negative one: no universal policy covering fir.ms in differing 
market and technological environments is likely to lead to an efficient 
rate and direction of technological innovation. 
Each industry operates in a particular environment with respect 
to market competition, the opportunities for technical progre s s ,  the 
extent to which nonprofit institutions are advancing the science upon which 
the industry is based, the appropriability of new ideas , the expectations 
of each firm with respect to the liklihood of innovation in the industry, 
and numerous other factors that will affect its own program of research, 
development and market innovation. A rational government policy 
would be predicated on an inve;itigation of the extent to which the condi­
tions of particular industries were congenial to an acceptably efficient 
rate of technical progr e s s .  For each industry policy interventions 
would then be tailored to the specific aspects of its economic and 
scientific environment. 
Although it is certainly beyond scientific proof given the existing 
development of knov:ledge, the most promising form of governmental 
intervention in most instances is probably through the award of grants 
an� prizes for specific projects and accomplishments . In general, directly 
increasing the financial incentive for promising R & D is  less likely 
to create inefficiencies than are programs designed to increase the 
monopoly power of the innovator. And financial incentives tied to specific 
projects, intended to tilt the scale slightly in favor of marginal projects, 
will avoid the expense of subsidizing activities that would take place 
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anyway or that are not of high social priority. As a theoretical matter, 
the m�pdmum potential impact of a given number of dollars spent by a 
grant-giving agency to subsidize specific research projects is greater 
than the maximum possible in1pact of a tax credit for R & D having an 
equal impact on federal revenues. The latter policy, even if provisipns 
are made so that it supports only increments to ·R & D, will still not 
be efficient since it will not be focused on those industries and projects 
where innovation is most retarded by the various market imperfections 
discussed above. For example, because of i.ts greater potential span of 
applicability, lesser appropriability and g�eater uncertainty, basic 
research probably should receive a larger proportion of subsidy than 
developmental research, but as a practical matter tax policy is unlikely 
to reflect this distinction. 
'I he principal obstacles to capturing the theoretical advantage 
of a system of grants and prizes are the slowness and risk-aversion of 
bureaucratic decision-n1aking proce s s e s .  In a world in which politicians 
with 20-20 hindsight can easily point with alarm to risky research 
ventnres that after the fact did not prove productive, executive bu.reaucrats 
are faced with .an incentive to stick to the safe, sure proposal. Prizes 
for significant innovative accomplishments present less of a problem to 
bureaucrats by elimina�ing son1e of the need to identify ex ante which 
projects are likeiy to be successful; however prizes given for work at 
any stage of the innovative process othe r than the final market test will 
still run s ome risk of proving later to have gone for work that proved 
economically barren. Nevertheless, furthe r exploration of the use of 
prizes for spurring innovative activity appears warranted. 
Another mechanism that might improve both the speed and risk­
taking. of bureaucrats is to establish several governmental entities for 
promoting the same types of research. In essence, the argument in 
support of this proposal is similar to that in support of competition in 
private markets: that it will improve the incentives for efficient 
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behavior on the part of the agencies supporting R & D activities ,  For 
example, an alternative to the present structure for supporting research 
on new energy sources would be to establish several agencies that could 
award grants for energy R & D. Pres umably there would be some 
incentive for an agency to try to be ide ntified as the source of financing 
for a technological development that significantly increased the 
availability of economical energy, rather than strictly to avoid supporting 
research down blind alleys. If this conjecture is valid, then it is a 
mistake to collect nearly all developmental reseach programs with 
respect to energy technology into a single organization such as the 
Energy Research and Development Agency. 
Finally, governmental programs for s upporting research and 
development probably should be budgeted in part over several years, 
rather than on the conventional annual cycle. The annual budgeting 
proce s s  induces agencies to favor projects that can generate at least 
some short-term results which can be used to justify maintaining or 
increasing next year1 s budget. This generates a bias towards projects 
promising incremental gains in knowledge, and away from more 
fundamental and potentially more beneficial projects requiring several 
years of effort. Since one of the main implications of the liFerature on 
the innovative process is that the more basic the research the more 
likely that private market decis.ions will lead to too little of it, this 
consequence of the annual budgeting process is particularly unfortunate 
as it only reinforces an inefficiency in the allocation of research effort 
that is already likely to be present. 
The R &: D Asses sment Program 
There is obviously much room for further research along the 
lines supported by the R &: D Asses sment Program of the National 
Science Foundation. If, as is argued above, policy must; be tailored 
to specific market and technical conditions in order to be efficient, a 
prerequisite to the development of rational policy is to delineate the 
conditions prevailing in major industries and how their performance 
, 
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diverges fron-i that which is efficient. Thus, case studies of innovation 
in particular industries, focusing on the extent t.o which the ,problems 
delineated in this paper may be present, should have high priority. , 
Case studies on industries are likely to be more productive 
than cross -industry studies of the effects of policies. For one thing, 
s tudies that focus on policies require as an input data on the innovative 
performance of industries that, in most instances, simply are not yet 
available. Such data will only be forthcoming if a rather complete set 
of industry studies, with similar underlying objectives and methodologies, 
is forthcoming. Second, the state of theoretical understanding of the 
innovative process in general is so rudimentary that well-grounded 
empirical studies of the effects of policies are probably impossible at 
this juncture . 
For example, the relationship of antitrust and patent policies 
to technological change depends in part on the re'iationship between 
market structure and the propensity to engage in innovative beha�ior. 
To shed light on the latter issue requires far better measures than we 
now have of the extent of competition i.n ·various industries. It also 
requires a· workable inodel of how expectations are formed about the 
innovative behaVior of other firms and the extent to which profitable 
R &. D can be built upon current scientific knowledge. Only when this 
is accomplished can reliable estimates be made of the ceteris paribus 
effects of increased competition on technological change, and only then 
can some attempt be made to assess the effects of making markets more 
competitive through antitrust actions or reductions in patent protection. 
Finally, the development of rational policy towards R & D 
depends critically on the elasticity of supply of innovative activity for 
the economy generally. The difficulties of estimating the extent to 
which productive R & D could be significantly increased in the aggregate 
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are surely immense, but the effort is worthwhile. The potential 
benefits of government programs to induce more innovation in lethargic 
industries will be greater if the resources attracted into R &: D by such 
policies represent in some measure a net increment to the nation's 
innovative activities.  
The scope of an inquiry into the su.pply of innovative activity 
must be broad, indeed. It must identify areas of economic activity that 
currently drain off significant numbers of talented people who might 
ctherwise engage in innovative activity, and the extent to which the 
s ocial productivity of their current activity may diverge from their 
earnings. For example, a major potential benefit of deregulation and : 
no-fault automobile insurance could conceivably be their effects on the 
demand for lawyers and the pGssibilities thereby created for increasing . 
the response of creative talent to increased opportunities in business 
and scientific activities more closely tied to innovative behavior. 
